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Semi-decentralized generalized Nash equilibrium
seeking in monotone aggregative games
Giuseppe Belgioioso and Sergio Grammatico
Abstract—We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seek-
ing problem for a population of agents playing aggregative games
with affine coupling constraints. We focus on semi-decentralized
communication architectures, where there is a central coor-
dinator able to gather and broadcast signals of aggregative
nature to the agents. By exploiting the framework of monotone
operator theory and operator splitting, we first critically review
the most relevant available algorithms and then design two novel
schemes: (i) a single-layer, fixed-step algorithm with convergence
guarantee for general (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone
aggregative games and (ii) a single-layer proximal-type algorithm
for a class of monotone aggregative games with linearly coupled
cost functions. We also design novel accelerated variants of two
algorithms via (alternating) inertial steps. Finally, we show via
numerical simulations that the proposed algorithms outperform
those in the literature in terms of convergence speed.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Aggregative games
A
N aggregative game is a set of coupled optimization
problems, each associated with an autonomous agent,
i.e., an independent decision maker, where the cost function of
each agent depends on some aggregate effect of all the agents
in the population [1], [2], [3]. Namely, the aggregative feature
arises whenever each agent is affected by the overall popula-
tion behavior, hence not by some specific agents. In general,
such a special feature is typical of incentive-based control in
competitive markets [4] and in fact engineering applications
of aggregative games span from demand side management in
the smart grid [5] [6] and charging control for plug-in electric
vehicles [7], [8], [9], [10], to spectrum sharing in wireless
networks [11] and network congestion control [12]. With these
motivating applications in mind, aggregative games have been
receiving high research interest, within the operations research
[13] and especially the automatic control [14], [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19] communities. Researchers have in fact studied
and proposed solutions to the generalized Nash equilibrium
problem (GNEP) in aggregative games, which is the problem
to compute a set of decisions such that each is individually
optimal given the others. Remarkably, the aggregative structure
has been exploited to mitigate the computational complexity
for large population size, and in fact the proposed solution
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algorithms are primarily non-centralized, i.e., almost (semi-)
decentralized and distributed, where the computations by the
agents are fully decoupled. Essentially, in semi-decentralized
algorithms, the agents do not communicate with each other,
but rely on a reliable central coordinator (e.g. an aggregator)
that gathers the local decisions in aggregative form and then
broadcasts (incentive) signals, e.g. dual variables, to all the
agents [15]. On the other hand, in distributed algorithms,
there is no central coordinator, so the agents communicate
with each other to cooperatively estimate or reach consensus
on the signals of common interest, e.g. dual and auxiliary
variables. The latter algorithmic setup is also called partial-
decision information [20], [21], because the agents do not
have direct access to the aggregative effect on their cost
functions, thus they should estimate it via reliable, truthful
peer-to-peer communications, e.g. via cooperative consensus
protocols. These features motivate us to focus on the semi-
decentralized algorithmic structure in this paper.
B. Literature review
The literature on semi-decentralized GNE seeking in ag-
gregative games is quite recent. In [15] Belgioioso and Gram-
matico designed the first semi-decentralized GNE seeking
algorithm for (non-strictly/strongly, non-cocoercive)monotone
aggregative games1, where the algorithm derivation relies
on the so-called forward-backward-forward (FBF) operator
splitting. In parallel, for the class of strongly monotone
games, Yi and Pavel proposed the first preconditioned forward-
backward (pFB) operator splitting method [22], [23], which
is applicable to aggregative games with semi-decentralized
algorithmic structure - as shown in [24], the outcome of the
pFB method for aggregative games is in fact the so-called
asymmetric project algorithm (APA) [25, §12.5.1], proposed
for aggregative games in [17]. Effectively, [15] and [22] are
the first works to adopt an elegant and general mathematical
approach based on monotone operator theory [26] to explic-
itly model GNEPs, to decouple the coupling constraints via
Lagrangian duality, and in turn to exploit operator splitting
methods for systematically designing (non-centralized) GNE
seeking algorithms. Next, we refer to some other relevant GNE
seeking algorithms for or applicable to aggregative games. For
a class of unconstrained strictly monotone games, in [6], Ye
and Hu proposed continuous-time saddle-point dynamics. For
strictly monotone games with equality coupling constraints,
1For ease of reading, with (strict/strongly) monotone game, we mean game
with (strict/strongly) monotone pseudo-subdifferential mapping (§II-C).
in [16], Liang, Yi and Hong proposed continuous-time pro-
jected pseudo-gradient dynamics paired with discontinuous
dynamics for dual and auxiliary variables. For unconstrained,
strongly monotone aggregative games, in [18], Deng and Liang
proposed continuous-time, integral consensus-based dynam-
ics. Recently, in [19], De Persis and Grammatico proposed
continuous-time, integral dynamics for a class of strongly
monotone aggregative games.
From the literature on (semi-decentralized) GNE seeking
in aggregative games, several critical issues emerge. First,
the solution methods available for general (non-strictly, non-
cocoercive) monotone aggregative games are limited to al-
gorithms that require at least two demanding computations
(projections) and two communications (between the agents
and the coordinator) at each iteration, see e.g. the FBF
[15] and extra-gradient (EG) based methods [25, §12.6.1];
instead, computationally convenient algorithms, e.g. the pFB
[23], require strong monotonicity of the game. Surprizingly,
there is currently no single-communication-per-iteration, fixed-
step algorithm for merely monotone aggregative games. For
instance, the pFB method does not always converge in merely
monotone games, not even under vanishing step sizes [27].
From a practical perspective, the available algorithms may
require a large number of iterations, and in particular of
communications between the agents and the central coordi-
nator, to converge. For example, algorithms based on the
iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR) [28] require double-
layer vanishing step sizes, which considerably slows down
convergence. In fact, some researchers are currently working
on accelerated algorithms for certain classes of (so far non-
generalized) NEPs [29]. Finally, often, the local step sizes of
the algorithms are based on global properties of the game data,
that however should be unknown to the local agents in practice
- on the contrary, little or no coordination among agents should
be necessary to set the step sizes with guaranteed convergence.
C. Contribution
In this paper, we fully exploit monotone operator theory
and operator splitting methodologies to study and address
the main technical and computational issues that currently
afflict (semi-decentralized) GNE seeking in aggregative games.
Specifically, our main contributions are summarized next:
1. We review the available (semi-decentralized) algorithms
from a general operator-theoretic perspective, which allows
us to establish basically the most general convergence
results and draw a fair technical comparison among these
algorithms (§III), as well as to possibly improve conver-
gence speed, e.g. via inertial accelerations;
2. We present the first single-layer, single-communication-
per-iteration, fixed-step algorithm for (non-strictly, non-
cocoercive) monotone aggregative games (§IV-A) - essen-
tially, the most desirable algorithmic features for the most
general class of monotone aggregative games one could
hope for;
3. We present a very fast, single-layer, single-communication-
per-iteration, fixed-step, proximal algorithm for a class of
(non-strictly) monotone aggregative games with linearly
coupled cost functions (§IV-B) - essentially, the most
desirable algorithmic features with the fastest convergence
ever experienced for a special, recurrent, class of monotone
aggregative games;
4. We design an alternating inertial acceleration scheme which
is applicable to some algorithms (§IV-C) and that, remark-
ably, outperforms the classic inertial acceleration in terms
of numerical convergence - mathematically, we prove that
our alternating inertia preserves averageness of operators,
thus the convergence is desirably Feje´r monotone.
D. Notation and definitions
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers, and R :=
R ∪ {∞} the set of extended real numbers. 0 (1) denotes
a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve
clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as
subscript. A⊗B denotes the Kronecker product between the
matrices A and B. For a square matrix A ∈ Rn×n, it transpose
is A⊤, [A]i,j represents the element on the row i and column
j. A ≻ 0 ( 0) stands for positive definite (semidefinite)
matrix. Given A ≻ 0, ‖·‖A denotes the A-induced norm, such
that ‖x‖A = x
⊤Ax. ‖A‖ denotes the largest singular value
of A. Given N scalars, a1, . . . , aN , diag(a1, . . . , aN ) denotes
the diagonal matrix with a1, . . . , aN on the main diagonal.
Given N vectors x1, . . . , xN ∈ R
n, x := col (x1, . . . , xN ) =
[x⊤1 , . . . , x
⊤
N ]
⊤.
Operator-theoretic definitions: Id(·) denotes the identity
operator. The mapping ιS : R
n → {0, ∞} denotes the
indicator function for the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e., ιS(x) = 0 if x ∈ S,
∞ otherwise. For a closed set S ⊆ Rn, the mapping projS :
Rn → S denotes the projection onto S, i.e., projS(x) =
argminy∈S ‖y − x‖. The set-valued mapping NS : R
n ⇒ Rn
denotes the normal cone operator for the set S ⊆ Rn, i.e.,
NS(x) = ∅ if x /∈ S,
{
v ∈ Rn | supz∈S v
⊤(z − x) ≤ 0
}
otherwise. For a function ψ : Rn → R, dom(ψ) := {x ∈
Rn | ψ(x) < ∞}; ∂ψ : dom(ψ) ⇒ Rn denotes its
subdifferential set-valued mapping, defined as ∂ψ(x) := {v ∈
Rn | ψ(z) ≥ ψ(x) + v⊤(z − x) for all z ∈ dom(ψ)};
proxψ(x) = argminy∈Rn ψ(y)+
1
2 ‖y − x‖
2
denotes its proxi-
mal operator. A set-valued mapping F : Rn ⇒ Rn is (strictly)
monotone if (u − v)⊤(x − y) ≥ (>) 0 for all x 6= y ∈ Rn,
u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y); F is η-strongly monotone, with η > 0,
if (u − v)⊤(x − y) ≥ η ‖x− y‖2 for all x 6= y ∈ Rn,
u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y). JF := (Id + F)−1 denotes the
resolvent operator of F ; fix (F) := {x ∈ Rn | x ∈ F(x)}
and zer (F) := {x ∈ Rn | 0 ∈ A(x)} denote the set of fixed
points and of zeros, respectively.
II. THE GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEM IN
AGGREGATIVE GAMES
A. Problem statement
We consider a set of N agents, where each agent i ∈ I :=
{1, . . . , N} shall choose its decision variable (i.e., strategy) xi
from the local decision set Ωi ⊂ Rn with the aim of minimiz-
ing its local cost function Ji (xi,x−i), which depends on the
local variable xi (first argument) and on the decision variables
of the other agents, x−i := col
(
{xj}j∈I\{i}
)
∈ Rn(N−1)
(second argument).
In this paper, we focus on the class of aggregative games,
where the cost function of each agent depends on the local
decision variable and on the value of the aggregation, i.e.,
avg(x) := 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi. (1)
Specifically, we consider local cost functions of the form
Ji(xi,x−i) := gi(xi) + fi (xi, avg(x)) , (2)
where gi : R
n → R is a convex, possibly non-smooth local
term and fi : R
n × Rn → R is continuously differentiable
and convex with respect to the local decision variable xi. The
cost functions as in (2) are the most general considered in the
literature of monotone games, see [30, Remark 1], [31].
Furthermore, we consider generalized games, where the
coupling among the agents arises not only via the cost
functions, but also via their feasible decision sets. In our
setup, the coupling constraints are described by an affine
function, x 7→ Ax− b, where A := [A1| . . . |AN ] ∈ Rm×nN ,
b :=
∑N
i=1 bi ∈ R
m. Thus, the collective global feasible set,
X ⊂ RnN , reads as
X =
(∏
i∈I Ωi
)⋂{
x ∈ RnN |Ax− b ≤ 0m
}
; (3)
while the feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ I is
characterized by the set-valued mapping Xi, defined as
Xi(x−i) :=
{
yi ∈ Ωi|Aiyi − bi ≤
∑N
j 6=i(bj −Ajxj)
}
,
where Ai ∈ R
m×n and bi are local parameters that define how
agent i is involved in the coupling constraints.
Remark 1: Affine coupling constraints, as considered in (3),
are very common in the literature of monotone games, see for
example [14], [16], [17], [23]. 
Next, let us formalize standard convexity and compactness
assumptions for the constraint sets and convexity for the local
cost functions.
Assumption 1: For each i ∈ I, the function gi is convex
and the function fi is continuously differentiable and convex
in xi. For each i ∈ I, the set Ωi is nonempty, compact and
convex. The set X satisfies Slater’s constraint qualification. 
In summary, the aim of each agent i, given the aggregate
decision avg(x), is to choose a strategy, x∗i , that solves its
local convex optimization problem according to the game
setup previously described, i.e., for all i ∈ I

argmin
xi∈Rn
Ji
(
xi,x−i
)
= gi(xi) + fi (xi, avg(x))
s.t. xi ∈ Ωi
Aixi ≤ bi +
∑N
j 6=i(bj −Ajxj)
(4)
where the last constraint is equivalent to Ax − b ≤ 0. From
a game-theoretic perspective, we consider the problem to
compute a Nash equilibrium [32], as formalized next.
Definition 1 (Generalized ε−Nash equilibrium): A collec-
tive strategy x∗ ∈ X is a generalized ε−Nash equilibrium
(ε−GNE) of the game in (4) if, for all i ∈ I:
Ji
(
x∗i ,x
∗
−i
)
≤ inf
{
Ji(y, x
∗
−i) + ε | y ∈ Xi(x
∗
−i)
}
. (5)
If (5) holds with ε = 0, then x∗ is a GNE. 
In other words, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium
if no agent can improve its objective function by unilaterally
changing its strategy to another feasible one.
Remark 2 (Existence of a GNE): Under Assumption 1, the
existence of a GNE of the game in (4) follows from Brouwer’s
fixed-point theorem [33, Proposition 12.7], while uniqueness
does not hold in general. 
B. Nash vs Aggregative (or Wardrop) Equilibria
In aggregative games with cost functions as in (2), the
condition in (5) specializes as: for all i ∈ I and y ∈ Xi(x∗−i)
gi(x
∗
i ) + fi (x
∗
i , avg(x
∗)) ≤ gi(y) + fi
(
y, 1
N
y + 1
N
∑N
j 6=i x
∗
j
)
,
where the decision variable of agent i, x∗i , appears also in
the second argument of fi, since x
∗
i contributes to form the
average strategy, i.e., avg(x∗) = 1
N
x∗i +
1
N
∑N
j 6=i x
∗
j .
The concept of aggregative (or Wardrop) equilibrium (for-
malized in Definition 2) springs from the intuition that the
contribution of each agent to the average strategy decreases
as the population size grows. Technically, the influence of the
decision variable of agent i on the second argument of its cost
function fi vanishes as N grows unbounded.
Definition 2 (Generalized Aggregative equilibrium): A
collective strategy x⋆ ∈ X is a generalized aggregative
equilibrium (GAE) of the game in (4) if, for all i ∈ I:
gi(x
⋆
i ) + fi (x
⋆
i , avg(x
⋆)) ≤
inf
{
gi(y) + fi
(
y, avg(x⋆)
)
| y ∈ Xi(x
⋆
−i)
}
.

We note that Nash and aggregative equilibria are strictly
connected. In fact, under some mild assumptions, it can be
proven that every GAE equilibrium is an ε-GNE equilibrium,
with ε vanishing as N diverges [17, §4]. Thus, in large scale
games where the agents are unaware of the population size, a
GAE represents a good approximation of a GNE.
C. Variational equilibria and pseudo-subdifferential mapping
In this paper, we focus on the subclass of variational GNE
(v-GNE) that corresponds to the solution set of an appropriate
generalized variational inequality, i.e., GVI(P,X ), namely, the
problem of finding x∗ ∈ X such that
〈z∗,x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X , z∗ ∈ P (x∗),
where the mapping P : RnN ⇒ RnN denotes the so-called
pseudo-subdifferential (PS) of the game in (4), defined as
P (x) :=
∏N
i=1 ∂xi Ji (xi, x−i) . (6)
Namely, the mapping P is obtained by stacking together the
subdifferentials of the agent cost functions with respect to their
local decision variables. Given the aggregative structure of the
cost functions in (2), we note that the PS can be written as
the sum of a set-valued mapping and a single-valued one:
P = G+ F,
where
G(x) :=
∏N
i=1 ∂gi(xi) (7)
F (x) := col
(
{∇xifi(xi, avg(x))}
N
i=1
)
. (8)
In the remainder of the paper, let us refer to F as pseudo-
gradient mapping (with a little abuse of terminology). Note
that, since the local decision variable xi of agent i enters also
in the second argument of the cost function fi, we have
∇xifi(xi, avg(x))
=
(
∇xifi(xi, z) +
1
N
∇zf(xi, z)
)∣∣
z=avg(x)
. (9)
Under Assumptions 1, it follows by [33, Prop. 12.4] that any
solution to GVI(P,X ) is a (variational) Nash equilibrium of
the game in (4). The inverse implication is not true in general,
and actually in passing from the Nash equilibrium problem to
the GVI problem most solutions are lost [33, §12.2.2]; indeed,
a game may have a Nash equilibrium while the corresponding
GVI has no solution. Note that, when the cost functions Ji’s
in (2) are differentiable, i.e., gi = 0 for all i ∈ I, then P is a
single-valued mapping and GVI(P,X ) reduces to VI(F,X ),
which is commonly addressed in the context of game theory
via projected-psuedogradient algorithms, e.g. [13], [17], [24],
[25, §12].
A sufficient condition for the existence (and uniqueness) of
a variational GNE (v-GNE) is that P is (strictly) monotone
[33, Prop. 12.11], as postulated next.
Assumption 2 (Monotone and Lipschitz pseudo-gradient):
The mapping F in (8) is maximally monotone and ℓ−Lipschitz
continuous over Ω, for some ℓ > 0. 
It directly follows that also the pseudo-subdifferential P
is maximally monotone since it is the sum of two maximally
monotone operators [26, Cor. 24.4], i.e., P = G+F , where G
is maximally monotone as concatenation of maximally mono-
tone operators (i.e., the subdifferentials of the convex functions
gi’s) [26, Prop. 20.23], and F is maximally monotone by
Assumption 2.
Remark 3 (Approximate pseudo-gradient): As the popula-
tion size grows, the second term in the right hand side of (9)
vanishes. In fact, we have that
lim
N→∞
∇xifi(xi, avg(x)) = ∇xifi(xi, z)
∣∣
z=avg(x)
. (10)
Thus, let us define an approximate version of the PG in (8)
for large-scale games, i.e.,
F˜ (x) := col
({
∇xifi(xi, z)
∣∣
z=avg(x)
}N
i=1
)
, (11)
and the correspondent approximate PS, i.e.,
P˜ := G+ F˜ . (12)
As for v-GNE, one can show that any solution to GVI(P˜ ,X )
is a (variational) aggregative equilibrium (v-GAE) of the game
in (4) [19]. 
D. Nash equilibria as zeros of a monotone operator
In this section, we exploit operator theory to recast the Nash
equilibrium problem into a monotone inclusion, namely, the
problem of finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator.
As first step, we characterize a GNE of the game in terms of
KKT conditions of the inter-dependent optimization problems
in (4). For each agent i ∈ N , let us introduce the Lagrangian
function Li, defined as
Li(x, λi) := Ji(xi,x−i) + ιΩi(xi) + λ
⊤
i (Ax− b),
where λi ∈ R
m
≥0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the coupling constraints. It follows from [33, §12.2.3] that the
set of strategies x∗ is a GNE of the game in (4) if and only if
there exist some dual variables λ∗1, . . . , λ
∗
N ∈ R
m
≥0 such that
the following coupled KKT conditions are satisfied:
∀i ∈ I :
{
0 ∈ ∂xiJi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) + NΩi (x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ
∗
i
0 ≤ λ∗i ⊥ −(Ax
∗ − b) ≥ 0
(13)
The Slater’s condition in Assumption 1 is needed at this stage
to ensures boundedness of the dual variables λi’s.
Similarly, we characterize a v-GNE in term of KKT con-
ditions by exploiting the Lagrangian duality scheme for the
corresponding GVI problem, see [34, §3.2]. Specifically, by
[34, Th. 3.1], x∗ is a solution of GVI(X , P ) if and only if
there exists a dual variable λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that{
0 ∈ ∂xiJi(x
∗
i ,x
∗
−i) + NΩi(x
∗
i ) +A
⊤
i λ
∗, ∀i ∈ I
0 ≤ λ∗ ⊥ −(Ax∗ − b) ≥ 0.
(14)
To cast (14) in compact form, we introduce the set-valued
mapping T : Ω× Rm≥0 ⇒ R
nN × Rm, defined as
T :
[
x
λ
]
7→
[
NΩ(x) + P (x) +A
⊤λ
NRm
≥0
(λ) − (Ax− b)
]
, (15)
Essentially, the role of the mapping T is that its zeros
correspond to the v-GNE of the game in (4), as formalized
in the next statement.
Proposition 1: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) x∗ is a v-GNE of the game in (4);
(ii) ∃λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that, the pair (x
∗
i , λ
∗) is a solution to
the KKT in (13), for all i ∈ I;
(iii) x∗ is a solution to GVI(P,X );
(iv) ∃λ∗ ∈ Rm≥0 such that col(x
∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ). 
Proof: The equivalences (i)⇔(ii)⇔(iii) are proven in [35,
Th. 3.1] while (iii)⇔(iv) follows by [34, Th. 3.1].
A similar equivalence can be derived for v-GAE.
Proposition 2: Let Assumption 1 hold. Then, the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) x⋆ is a v-GAE of the game in (4);
(ii) ∃λ⋆ ∈ Rm≥0 such that, the pair (x
⋆
i , λ
⋆) is a solution to the
KKT in (13) with ∂xiJi(x
⋆
i ,x
⋆
−i) replaced by gi(x
⋆
i ) +
∇xifi(x
⋆
i , z)
∣∣
z=avg(x⋆)
, for all i ∈ I;
(iii) x⋆ is a solution to GVI(P˜ ,X );
(iv) ∃λ⋆ ∈ Rm≥0 such that col(x
⋆, λ⋆) ∈ zer(T˜ ), where
T˜ is equivalent to T in (15) with P replaced by its
approximation P˜ in (12). 
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1.
III. GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING:
OPERATOR-THEORETIC REVIEW
A. Zero finding methods for GNE seeking
In Section II-D, we show that the original GNE seeking
problem corresponds to the following generalized equation:
find ω∗ := col(x∗,λ) ∈ zer(T ). (16)
Next, we show that the mapping T can be written as the sum
of two operators, i.e., T = T1 + T2, where
T1 : ω 7→ col(F (x), b); (17)
T2 : ω 7→
(
NΩ(x) +G(x)
)
×NRm
≥0
(λ) + Sω (18)
and S is a skew symmetric matrix, i.e., S⊤ = −S, defined as
S :=
[
0 A⊤
−A 0
]
. (19)
The formulation T = T1 + T2 is called splitting of T , and
we exploit it in different ways later on. We show next that
the mappings T1 and T2 are both maximally monotone, which
paves the way for operator splitting algorithms [26, § 26].
Lemma 1: Let Assumption 2 hold true. The mappings T1
in (17), T2 in (18) and T in (15) are maximally monotone. 
Proof: T1 is maximally monotone since F is such by
Assumption 2, b is a constant, thus maximally monotone, and
the concatenation of maximally monotone operator remains
maximally monotone [26, Prop. 20.23]. The first term of T2,
i.e., (NΩ+G
)
×NRm
≥0
, is maximally monotone, since normal
cones of closed convex sets are maximally monotone and the
concatenation preserves maximality [26, Prop. 20.23]; the sec-
ond term, i.e., S, is linear and skew symmetric, i.e., S⊤ = −S,
thus maximally monotone [26, Ex. 20.30]. Then, the sum of
the previous terms, namely, T2, is maximally monotone by [26,
Cor. 24.4], since domS = RnN+m. Equivalently, the maximal
monotonicity of T = T1 + T2 follows from [26, Cor. 24.4],
since domT1 = R
nN+m.
In the remainder of this section we discuss the main features
and limitations of some existing semi-decentralized algorithms
for aggregative games with coupling constraints from a general
operator-theoretic perspective.
Remark 4 (Generalized aggregative equilibrium seeking):
In light of Proposition 2, the same operator theoretic approach
can be exploited to recast the GAE seeking problem as a
monotone inclusion. It follows that all the GNE seeking
algorithms introduced in the remainder of this paper can
be adopted to find a GAE. Specifically, for gradient-based
algorithms, it is sufficient to replace ∇xifi(xi, avg(x)) in (9)
with its approximate version i.e., ∇xifi(xi, z)
∣∣
z=avg(x)
.
B. Preconditioned forward-backward algorithm
The main idea of the preconditioned forward-backward
algorithm (pFB) is that the zeros of the mapping T in (15)
correspond to the fixed points of a certain operator which
depends on the chosen splitting (17)−(18) [26, §26.3] and
on an arbitrary symmetric, positive definite matrix Φ, known
as preconditioning matrix [22]. The pFB method, proposed in
ALGORITHM 1: Preconditioned forward-backward (pFB)
Initialization: δ > 12γ ; ∀i ∈ I, x
0
i ∈ R
n, 0 < αi ≤ (‖Ai‖ +
δ)−1; λ0 ∈ Rm≥0, 0 < β ≤ (
1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖Ai‖+
1
N
δ)−1.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
yki = x
k
i − αi(∇xifi(x
k
i , avg(x
k)) +A⊤i λ
k),
xk+1i = proxαigi+ιΩi (y
k
i ),
dk+1i = 2Aix
k+1
i −Aix
k
i − bi,
2. Central coordinator: dual variable update
λk+1 = proj
Rm
≥0
(
λk + β avg(dk+1)
)
.
[22] for strongly monotone games, is applicable to aggregative
games with semi-decentralized algorithmic structure [24], in
which case it reduces to the APA [25, §12.5.1], also proposed
in [17]. A critical assumption for the convergence of this
method is the cocoercivity of the pseudogradient mapping F
in (8), as postulated next.
Assumption 3 (Cocoercive pseudo-gradient): The mapping
F in (8) is γ−cocoercive on Ω, for some γ > 0. 
Remark 5: If F is µ−strongly monotone and ℓ−Lipschitz,
µ, ℓ > 0, then F is (µ/ℓ2)−cocoercive. On the contrary,
cocoercive mappings are not necessarily strongly monotone,
e.g. the gradient of a non-strictly convex, smooth function. 
Remark 6: a) The local auxiliary variables yi’s and di’s
are introduced to cast Algorithm 1 in a more compact form.
The quantity avg(dk+1) := 1
N
∑N
i=1(2Aix
k+1
i − Aix
k
i − bi)
measures the violation of the coupling constraints, technically,
is the “reflected violation” of the constraints at iteration k.
b) The proximal operator in Algorithm 1 reads as
proxαigi+ιΩi (y) = argmin
z∈Ωi
gi(z) +
1
2αi
‖z − y‖2.
If the cost function of agent i is continuously differentiable,
i.e., gi = 0, then its primal update in Algorithm 1 becomes a
projection, i.e., proxgi+ιΩi
= projΩi . 
If Assumption 3 holds true and the step sizes {αi}i∈I and β
are chosen small enough, then the sequence (col(xk, λk))k∈N
generated by Algorithm 1 converges to some col(x∗, λ∗) ∈
zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE, see [24, Th. 1] for a formal
proof of convergence.
Algorithm 1 is semi-decentralized. In fact, at each iteration
k, a central coordinator is needed to:
(i) gather and broadcast the average strategy avg(xk);
(ii) gather the reflected violation of the constraints avg(dk);
(iii) update and broadcast the dual variable λk.
Specifically, after each central and local update in Algorithm
1, a communication stage follows. The central coordinator
broadcasts to all the agents the current values of the aggregate
function avg(xk) and the multiplier vector λk. In return,
each agent i ∈ I updates its own strategy xi, based on the
received signals, and forwards it to the central coordinator.
Moreover, at each iteration only two vectors, in Rn and Rm
respectively, are broadcast, independently on the population
size N . Each decentralized computation consists of solving
a finite dimensional convex optimization problem, for which
efficient algorithms are available.
Remark 7: The primal-dual iterations of Algorithm 1 are
sequential, namely, while the local primal updates xk+1i can
be performed in parallel, the dual update, λk+1, exploits the
most recent value of the agents’ strategies, dk+1i . This feature
is convenient since it follows the natural information flow in
the considered semi-decentralized communication structure. 
Algorithm 1 as a fixed-point iteration: The dynamics gen-
erated by Algorithm 1 can be cast in a compact form as the
fixed-point iteration
ωk+1 = RFB(ω
k), (20)
where ωk = col(xk, λk) is the vector of the primal-dual
variables and RFB is the so-called FB operator [26, Eq. (26.7)]:
RFB := (Id + Φ
−1T2)
−1 ◦ (Id− Φ−1T1), (21)
where T1 and T2 as in (17)−(18) and Φ is a preconditining
matrix, here defined as
Φ :=
[
α¯−1 ⊗ In −A⊤
−A Nβ−1In
]
, (22)
with α¯ = diag(α1, . . . , αN ). When the mapping T1 is coco-
ercive (Assumption 3), T2 is maximally monotone (Lemma
1) and the step-sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are set as in
Algorithm 1, then the preconditioned mappings Φ−1T1 and
Φ−1T2 satisfy the following properties with respect to the
Φ−induced norm ([23, Lemma 7]):
(i) Φ−1T1 is γδ−cocoercive w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Φ,
(ii) Φ−1T2 is maximally monotone w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Φ.
It follows from [26, Prop. 26.1 (iv-d)] that the FB operator
RFB in (21) is averaged with respect to the same norm, i.e.,
(iii) RFB is
(
2δγ
4δγ−1
)
−averaged w.r.t. ‖ · ‖Φ.
Hence, the Banach–Picard fixed-point iteration in (20) con-
verges to some ω∗ := col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ fix(RFB) [26, Prop. 5.16],
where fix(RFB) = zer(T ) 6= ∅ and, therefore, x∗ is a v-GNE
by Prop. 1. We refer to [23], [24] for a complete convergence
analysis of this algorithm.
Inertial pFB algorithm: To conclude this section, we recall
the inertial version of the pFB (Algorithm 1), originally
proposed for the more general context of generalized network
games in [23, Alg. 2].
We note that the inertial extrapolation phase, at the end of
the local and central updates, improves the converge properties
of the pFB algorithm. The convergence of Algorithm 1B can
be studied via fixed-point theory [36], or by relying on the
inertial version of the FB splitting method [37], as discussed
in the next remark. We refer to [23, Th. 2] for a complete
convergence proof of this algorithm.
ALGORITHM 1B: Inertial pFB (I-pFB)
Initialization: δ > 12γ ; for all i ∈ I, x
0
i = x˜
0
i ∈ R
n, 0 < αi ≤
(‖Ai‖ + δ)−1; λ0 = λ˜0 ∈ Rm≥0, 0 < β ≤ (
1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖Ai‖ +
1
N
δ)−1; θ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. 2γδ(1 − 3θ − ǫ) ≥ (1 − θ)2, with
ǫ ∈ (0, 1) small enough.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
yki = x˜
k
i − αi(∇xifi(x˜
k
i , avg(x˜
k)) +A⊤i λ˜
k),
xk+1i = proxαigi+ιΩi
(yki ),
x˜k+1i = x
k+1
i + θ(x
k+1
i − x
k
i ),
dk+1i = 2Aix
k+1
i −Aix˜
k
i − bi,
2. Central coordinator: Dual variable update
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
(
λ˜k + β avg(dk+1)
)
,
λ˜k+1 = λk+1 + θ(λk+1 − λk),
Algorithm 1B as a fixed-point iteration: The dynamics
generated by Algorithm 1B can be cast in a compact form
as the following inertial fixed-point iteration:
ω˜k = ωk + θ(ωk − ωk−1), (23a)
ωk+1 = RFB(ω˜
k), (23b)
where ωk = col(xk, λk) and ω˜k = col(x˜k, λ˜k) are the
stacked vectors of the iterates and RFB is the FB operator
defined in (21). The convergence analysis of inertial schemes
as in (23) are studied in [36]; while more precise conditions
for the convergence of (23) are derived in [37, Th. 1].
C. Algorithms for (non-strictly) monotone aggregative games
When the pseudo-gradient mapping F is non-cocoercive,
non-striclty monotone, then Algorithm 1 may fail to con-
verge, see [27] for an example of non-convergence of Al-
gorithm 1. Few algorithms are available in the literature for
solving merely monotone (aggregative) games with coupling
constraints, each with important technical or computational
limitations.
Iterative Tikhonov regularization: To be applicable to ag-
gregative games with (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone
pseudo-gradient mapping, the forward-backward algorithm
should be augmented with a vanishing regularization. This ap-
proach - originally developed in the broader context of network
games - is known as iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR)
and generates a forward-backward algorithm with double-
layer vanishing step sizes [28], where the actual step size
must vanish faster than the vanishing regularization term [28,
(A2.2), §2.1]. The next table summarizes the ITR algorithm
when applied to generalized aggregative games.
The convergence of the sequence (xk)k∈N generated by
Algorithm 2 to a v-GNE is guaranteed when the pseudo-
gradient mapping F is monotone and Lipschitz continuous
(Assumption 2) and the step-size sequences (γk)k∈N and
ALGORITHM 2: Iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR)
Initialization: For all i ∈ I: γki = (k + nj)
−β and ǫki =
(k + nj)
−α with 1/2 < α+ β ≤ 1, β > α and nj ∈ N>0.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
yki = x
k
i − γ
k
i (∇xifi(x
k
i , avg(x
k)) + A⊤i λ
k + ǫki x
k
i ),
xk+1i = projΩi (y
k
i ),
dk+1i = Aix
k+1
i − bi,
2. Central coordinator: Dual variable update
λk+1 = proj
R
m
≥0
(
λk + γki (Navg(d
k+1)− ǫki λ
k)
)
.
(ǫk)k∈N are driven to zero at appropriate rates. A formal
proof of convergence can be found in [28], where the step-
size sequences either match across users (fully coordinated)
or may differ (partially coordinated).
In practice, methods based on (double-layer) vanishing step
sizes have slow speed of convergence, which is computation-
ally undesirable. Differentiability of the local cost functions,
i.e., gi = 0 for all i ∈ I, is another technical limitation of ITR
schemes.
Inexact preconditioned proximal-point: Recently, the inex-
act preconditioned proximal-point (PPP) method [30] was pro-
posed to solve monotone (aggregative) games, virtually with
no additional technical assumption other than monotonicity
of the pseudo-subdifferential mapping P . Algorithm 3 sum-
marizes the application of the PPP algorithm to aggregative
games.
At each iteration k, the inner loop (step 2) of Alg. 3 consists
of solving (inexactly) an aggregative game without coupling
constraints, whose PS, i.e., F¯ k(y) = P (y) +A⊤λk + α¯(y −
xk), is (min{αi}i∈I)−strongly monotone.
Algorithm 3 as a fixed-point iteration: The dynamics gen-
erated by Algorithm 3 can be cast in compact form as the
fixed-point iteration:
ωk+1 = JΦ−1T (ω
k) + ek, (24)
where ωk = col(xk, λk) is the vector of primal-dual iterates,
JΦ−1T is the so-called resolvent operator of the mapping
Φ−1T , defined as
JΦ−1T := (Id + Φ
−1T )−1, (25)
and ek is an error term that accounts for the inexact compu-
tations of the resolvent JΦ−1T (ω
k).
When the mapping T is maximally monotone (Lemma 1)
and the step-sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are set such that
Φ ≻ 0, then the resolvent JΦ−1T is firmly nonexpansive [26,
Prop. 23.8] (1/2−averaged) w.r.t. the Φ-induced norm, i.e.,
‖ · ‖Φ. Moreover, if the error sequence (ek)k∈N is summable
(which is guaranteed by setting
∑∞
k=0 εk < ∞), then the
inexact fixed-point iteration (24) converges to some ω∗ :=
col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ fix(JΦ−1T ) = zer(T ) [26, Prop. 5.34], where
ALGORITHM 3: Preconditioned proximal-point (PPP)
Initialization: (εk)k∈N s.t.
∑∞
k=0 εk <∞; ∀i ∈ N : x
0
i ∈ R
n,
αi > (‖Ai‖)
−1; λ0 ∈ Rm≥0, β < (
1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖Ai‖)
−1.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Augmented cost function update. For all i ∈ I:
J¯ki (xi,x−i) = Ji (xi,x−i) + (A
⊤
i λ
k)
⊤
xi + αi‖xi − x
k
i ‖
2
2. Inner loop (ε−NE seeking problem): find x¯1, . . . , x¯N s.t.
∀i ∈ I, J¯ki (x¯i, x¯−i) ≤ inf
{
J¯ki (y, x¯−i) + ε | y ∈ Ωi
}
3. Local: Centroid update. For all i ∈ I:
xk+1i = x¯i,
dk+1i = 2Aix
k+1
i −Aix
k
i − bi,
4. Central coordinator: Dual variable update
λk+1 = proj
Rm
≥0
(λk + β avg(dk+1))
x∗ is a v-GNE. We refer to [30] for a complete convergence
analysis of Algorithm 3.
Remark 8 (Double-layer): Unfortunately, the PPP method
generates a double-layer algorithm, in which each (outer)
iteration involves the solution of a sub-game without coupling
constraints, via nested (inner) iterations, and, therefore, re-
quires multiple communication stages between the agents and
the central coordinator. As for (doubly) vanishing step sizes,
we can regard double-layer or nested iterations as an important
computational limitation. 
Tseng’s forward-backward-forward splitting: To solve non-
cocoercive, non-strictly monotone aggregative games via non-
vanishing iterative steps or nested iterations, the forward-
backward-forward (FBF) method [26, §26.6] adds an addi-
tional forward step to the FB algorithm. In Algorithm 4,
we introduce a modified version of the FBF algorithm for
aggregative games, originally proposed in [15, Alg. 1].
Algorithm 4 improves [15, Alg. 1] on two main aspects:
(i) (Partially uncoordinated step-sizes) each agent i ∈ I and
the central coordinator have decision authority on their
own local step-sizes;
(ii) (Additional projection) The local updates in step 3 and
the central update in step 4 are projected onto the
local feasible sets, Ωi’s and R
m
≥0, respectively. These
additional projections make sure that the iterates xki ’s
live in the domain of correspondent functions fi’s and in
fact can improve the convergence speed of the algorithm.
The convergence analysis of Algorithm 4 is (almost) identical
to that of [15, Alg. 1], thus we briefly discuss it next.
Algorithm 4 as a fixed-point iteration: In compact form, the
dynamics generated by Algorithm 4 read as the fixed-point
iteration
ωk+1 = RFBF(ω
k), (26)
ALGORITHM 4: Tseng’s forward-backward-forward (FBF)
Initialization: For all i ∈ I, x0i ∈ R
n and 0 < αi < (ℓ +
‖A‖)−1; λ0 ∈ Rm≥0 and 0 < β < (ℓ + ‖A‖)
−1.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
yki = x
k
i − αi(∇xifi(x
k
i , avg(x
k)) +A⊤i λ
k),
x˜ki = proxαigi+ιΩi (y
k
i ),
d˜ki = Aix
k
i − bi,
2. Central coordinator: dual variable update
λ˜k = projRm
≥0
(
λk + β avg(d˜
k
)
)
,
3. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
rk+1i = x˜
k
i − αi(∇xifi(x˜
k
i , avg(x˜
k)) +A⊤i λ˜
k),
xk+1i = projΩi(x
k
i − y
k
i + r
k+1
i ),
dk+1i = Aix˜
k
i − bi,
4. Central coordinator: dual variable update
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
(
λ˜k + β(avg(dk+1)− avg(d˜
k
))
)
.
where ωk = col(xk, λk) is the stacked vector of the primal-
dual variables and RFBF is the so-called FBF operator, i.e.,
RFBF := projΩ×Rm
≥0
◦ (Id−Ψ−1U1)
◦ (Id + Ψ−1U2)
−1 ◦ (Id−Ψ−1T1) + Ψ
−1U1,
where U1 and U2 characterize an alternative splitting of the
mapping T in (15), i.e., T = U1 + U2, where
U1 : ω 7→ col(F (x), b) + Sω, (27)
U2 : ω 7→
(
NΩ(x) +G(x)
)
×NRm
≥0
(λ), (28)
and Ψ is the preconditining matrix, here defined as
Ψ :=
[
α¯−1 ⊗ In 0
0 Nβ−1In
]
. (29)
When the mappings U1 and U2 are maximally monotone
(which can be proven when Assumption 2 holds true by
following a similar technical reasoning of that in Lemma 1),
U1 is Lipschitz continuous (Assumption 2) and the step sizes
in the main diagonal of Ψ are set small enough, then the fixed-
point iteration (26) converges to some ω∗ := col(x∗,λ∗) ∈
fix(RFBF) = zer(T ) ∩ (Ω × Rm≥0) = zer(T ) [26, Th. 25.10],
where x∗ is a v-GNE. We refer to [15, Th. 2], for a complete
convergence analysis which is applicable to Algorithm 4.
Remark 9 (Double communication round): At each central
and local update of Algorithm 4 a communication takes place.
Hence, each iteration of Algorithm 4 requires two communi-
cation rounds between the agents and central operator. 
IV. GENERALIZED NASH EQUILIBRIUM SEEKING:
ADVANCED ALGORITHMS
In this section, we design two novel semi-decentralized
GNE seeking algorithms obtained by solving the monotone
inclusion in (16) with different zero-finding methods: the
forward-reflected-backward splitting [38] and, for a particular
subclass of aggregative games with linear-coupling functions,
the proximal-point method with (alternated) inertia. The main
features of the proposed algorithms, e.g. convergence guar-
antees and communication requirements, are summarized and
compared with those of the existing methods in Table I.
A. (Inertial) Forward-reflected-backward algorithm
In this section, we present a single-layer, single communi-
cation round algorithm for monotone generalized aggregative
games that overcomes the technical and computational limita-
tions of all the algorithms in Section III-C. The design of the
proposed method is based on the Forward-Reflected-Backward
splitting (FoRB) recently proposed in [38] to find a zero of the
sum of two maximally monotone operators, one of which is
single-valued and Lipschitz continuous. The proposed method
is summarized in Algorithm 5.
Also for Algorithm 5, we describe the generated dynamics
as a compact inertial fixed-point iteration,
ωk+1 = (Id + Φ−1T2)
−1(ωk − 2Φ−1T1(ω
k)
+ Φ−1T1(ω
k−1) + θ(ωk − ωk−1)), (30)
where ωk = col(xk, λk) is the stacked vector of primal-
variable iterates, the components mappings T1, T2 as in
(17)−(18) and the preconditioning Φ as in (22). If the step-
sizes in the main diagonal of Φ are chosen small enough,
then the iteration (30), namely, the inertial FoRB splitting [38,
Corollary 4.4] on the operators Φ−1T1 and Φ
−1T2, converges
to some ω∗ := col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(T1 + T2) = zer(T ), where
x∗ is a v-GNE.
ALGORITHM 5: Inertial FoRB (I-FoRB)
Initialization: θ ∈ [0, 1/3) and δ > 2ℓ/(1 − 3θ), with ℓ as
in Assumption 2; ∀i ∈ I, set x˜0i = x˜
0
i + θ(x˜
0
i − x˜
−1
i ) and
0 < αi ≤ (‖Ai‖ + δ)
−1; λ˜0i = λ˜
0
i + θ(λ˜
0
i − λ˜
−1
i ), 0 < β ≤
( 1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖Ai‖+
1
N
δ)−1.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
rki = 2∇xifi(x
k
i , avg(x
k))−∇xifi(x
k−1
i , avg(x
k−1)),
xk+1i = proxαigi+ιΩi
(
x˜ki − αi(r
k
i +A
⊤
i λ
k)
)
,
x˜k+1i = x
k+1
i + θ(x
k+1
i − x
k
i ),
dk+1i = 2Aix
k+1
i −Aix
k
i − bi,
2. Central coordinator: dual variable update
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
(
λ˜k + β avg(dk+1)
)
,
λ˜k+1 = λk+1 + θ(λk+1 − λk).
TABLE I: Comparison among v-GNE algorithms. Legend: C stands for coordinated step-sizes, P-UC for partially uncoodinated,
F-UC for fully uncoordinated; MON for monotone, SMON for stronglymonotone, COCO stands for (monotone and) cocoercive.
APA
[17, Alg. 2]
pFB [24]
(Alg. 1)
ITR [28]
(Alg. 2)
PPP [30]
(Alg. 3)
FBF [15]
(Alg. 4)
FoRB [This work]
(Alg. 5)
cPPP [This work]
(Alg. 6)
Communications / iteration 1 1 1 ∞ 2 1 1
Local step sizes fixed,
C
fixed,
P-UC
vanishing,
P-UC
fixed,
P-UC
fixed,
P-UC
fixed,
P-UC
fixed,
F-UC
Pseudo-subdifferential SMON COCO MON MON MON MON MON
Local cost functions diff. non-diff.
as in (2)
diff. non-diff.
as in (2)
non-diff.
as in (2)
non-diff.
as in (2)
linear coupling
as in (31)
Inertial version X X X X
Alternating inertia X X X
Over-relaxation X X X
Local inertial parameters - C - F-UC - P-UC F-UC
Our first main result is to establish global convergence of
Algorithm 5 to a v-GNE when the mapping F is maximally
monotone and Lipschitz continuous (Assumption 2) and the
step sizes are chosen small enough.
Theorem 1: (Convergence of FoRB (Algorithm 5)) Let As-
sumption 1, 2 hold true. The sequence (col(xk, λk))k∈N gener-
ated by Algorithm 5, globally converges to some col(x∗, λ∗) ∈
zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE. 
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 10 (Single communication round): To the best of
our knowledge, Algorithms 4 (FBF) and 5 (FoRB) are the only
single-layer, fixed-step algorithms for GNE seeking in (non-
cocoercive, non-striclty) monotone generalized (aggregative)
games. The main advantage of Algorithm 5 is that it requires
only one communication round (between the agents and the
central coordinator) per iteration instead of the two required
by the FBF, see also Remark 9. 
B. Customized preconditioned proximal point algorithm
In this subsection, we focus on a particular class of aggrega-
tive games, where the cost functions have the form
Ji(xi,x−i) = gi(xi) + (C avg(x))
⊤
xi, (31)
where C ∈ Sn is a symmetric matrix. We emphasize that this
particular structure arises in several engineering applications,
where xi denotes the usage level of a certain commodity,
whose disutility is modeled by the cost function gi(xi), while
the term Cavg(x) represents a price function that linearly
depends on the average usage level of the overall population,
see [5], [39], [40], [41] for some application examples.
The next statement shows that aggregative games with such
special structure are potential games [42, Def. 2.1].
Lemma 2: There exists a continuous function φ : RnN →
R such that ∇φ = P , with P =
∏N
i=1 ∂xi Ji (xi, x−i). 
Proof: For aggregative games with liner coupling func-
tions as in (31), the pseudo-subdifferential P in (6) reads as
P =
∏N
i=1 ∂xigi +
1
N
(IN + 1N1
⊤
N )⊗ C, (32)
Algorithm 6: Inertial customized PPP (I-cPPP)
Initialization: 0 ≤ θk ≤ θk+1 ≤ θ < 1/3 for all k ≥ 0; for
all i ∈ I, x0i ∈ R
n, 0 < αi < ‖Ai‖ +
N−1
N
‖C‖; λ0 ∈ Rm≥0,
0 < β < ( 1
N
∑N
i=1 ‖Ai‖)
−1.
Iterate until convergence:
1. Local: Strategy update, for all i ∈ I:
yki = x˜
k
i + αi
(
C avg(x˜k) +A⊤i λ˜
k
)
,
xk+1i = argmin
z∈Ωi
gi(z) +
1
2αi
∥∥z − yki ∥∥2 + 1N (C(z − x˜ki ))⊤z,
x˜k+1i = x
k+1
i + θ
k(xk+1i − x
k
i ), (33)
dk+1i = 2Aix
k+1
i −Aix˜
k
i − bi,
2. Central Coordinator: dual variable update
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
(
λ˜k + β avg(dk+1)
)
,
λ˜k+1 = λk+1 + θk(λk+1 − λk). (34)
which is a symmetric mapping, i.e., ∇xP (x) = ∇xP (x)⊤
for all x ∈ Ω. Thus, the proof follows by [25, Th. 1.3.1].
It follows by Lemma 2 that a v-GNE of the game in
(4) corresponds to a solution to the optimization problem
argmin φ(x) s.t. x ∈ X . However, in many practical setups,
a centralized solution to this problem is not feasible since
it would require a high degree of coordination among self-
ish agents and also an “unbearable overload of information
exchange” [42, §3.3]. Moreover, distributed optimization al-
gorithms, see e.g. [43], can only deal with feasible sets X
in (7) with Cartesian product structure, namely, the case of
non-generalized games. This motivates us to investigate a cus-
tomized algorithm for aggregative games with cost functions
as in (31), which we summarize in the next table.
The next theorem establishes global convergence of Al-
gorithm 6 to a v-GNE of aggregative games with linear
coupling functions as in (31), when the associated pseudo-
subdifferential P is maximally monotone, as postulated next.
Assumption 4: The pseudo-subdifferential mapping P in
(6) is maximally monotone over Ω. 
We remark that this Assumption is less strict than Assump-
tion 2, since the monotonicity of the coupled part F is not
required. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the (strong)
monotonicity of P for this class of aggregative games are
discussed in [44, Cor. 1]. For instance, C < 0 is sufficient to
guarantee a maximally monotone pseudo-subdifferential.
Theorem 2: (Convergence of I-cPPP (Algorithm 6)) Con-
sider the game in (4) with cost functions as in (31).
Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold true. Then, the sequence
(col(xk, λk))k∈N generated by Algorithm 6, globally con-
verges to some col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE.

Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 11: As for gradient-based methods, to compute a
v-GNE via Algorithm 6, the agents must know the population
size, N . However, if an approximate solution, i.e., a v-GAE, is
equally desirable, this requirement can be relaxed by removing
the correction term 1
N
(
C(z − x˜ki )
)⊤
z in the local updates:
xk+1i =proxαigi+ιΩi
(
x˜ki − αi(Cavg(x˜
k)+A⊤i λ˜
k)
)
.

Algorithm 6 as a fixed-point iteration: In compact form,
the dynamics generated by Algorithm 6 read as the inertial
fixed-point iteration
ω˜k = ωk + θk(ωk − ωk−1) (35a)
ωk+1 = JΦ−1
C
T (ω˜
k), (35b)
where ωk = col(xk, λk) is the stacked vector of primal-dual
iterates, JΦ−1
C
T = (Id+Φ
−1
C T )
−1 is the generalized resolvent
operator of the mapping T in (15) with preconditioning matrix
ΦC := Φ +
[
1
N
(IN−1N1
⊤
N
)⊗C 0
0 0
]
, (36)
with Φ as in (22). The iteration in (35) corresponds to the
inertial preconditioned proximal-point method in [45] applied
to the mapping T . When T is maximally monotone (which
follows by Assumption 4) and the step-sizes in the main
diagonal of Φ are set such that ΦC ≻ 0, then JΦ−1
C
T is firmly
nonexpansive (1/2−averaged) w.r.t. the ΦC−induced norm, ‖·
‖ΦC . Moreover, if the inertial parameter θ
k are non-decreasing
and small enough, then the inertial fixed-point iteration (35)
converges to some ω∗ := col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ fix(JΦ−1
C
T ) = zer(T )
[45, Th. 2.1, Prop. 2.1], where x∗ is a v-GNE. We provide
the full convergence analysis in Appendix B.
Remark 12 (cPPP is a single-layer algorithm): Both the
PPP (Algorithm 3) and our cPPP (Algorithm 6) rely on the
same fixed-point iteration, which is generated by proximal-
point method. However, while the PPP is double-layer,
namely, it requires the solution of a sub-game at each
iteration, cPPP is single-layer. The idea behind the cPPP
is in fact to exploit the special structure of the pseudo-
subdifferential P in (32) to customize the preconditioning
matrix, ΦC, and in turn solve the inner loop of the PPP with
a single implicit iteration, namely, the parallel solution of N
local, decoupled, strongly convex optimization problems. 
Remark 13 (Fully-uncoordinated step-sizes): Unlike all the
previously presented gradient-based algorithms, the choice of
the local step-sizes and inertial parameters in Algorithm 6 is
based on local information only. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first and only inertial, fixed-step v-GNE seeking
algorithm that enjoys this important property. 
Over-relaxed cPPP (Algorithm 6B): To conclude this sec-
tion, we present the over-relaxed variant of cPPP, i.e., or-cPPP.
This new method is obtained by substituting the inertial steps
of primal and dual variables in Algorithm 6, i.e., (33) and (34),
respectively, with the relaxation steps
x˜k+1i = x˜
k
i + θ
k(xk+1i − x˜
k
i ), (37)
λ˜k+1i = λ˜
k + θk(λk+1 − λ˜k), (38)
where the relaxation sequence
(
θk
)
k∈N
must be chosen s.t.
θk ∈ [0, 2] ∀k ∈ N,
∑
k∈N θ
k(2− θk) =∞. (39)
Similarly to Algorithm 6, or-cPPP can be compactly cast as
the following Krasnosel’skii-Mann fixed-point iteration:
ω˜k+1 = ω˜k + θk(JΦ−1
C
T (ω˜
k)− ω˜k). (40)
Thus, its convergence readily follows by [26, Prop. 5.16],
since the generalized resolvent JΦ−1
C
T is
1
2−averaged w.r.t.
the ΦC−induced norm [26, Prop. 23.8]. While there is no
interest in doing under-relaxation with θk less than 1, over-
relaxation with θk larger than 1 (close to 2) may be beneficial
for the convergence speed, as often observed in practice.
Interestingly, the choice of the over-relaxation steps θk in (39)
is independent from the properties of the mapping T .
C. Alternating inertial steps for averaged operators
In this subsection, we propose an alternating inertial scheme
which is applicable to the algorithms in Sections III and
IV, and whose updates can be described as a special fixed-
point iteration of an averaged operator. An advantage of this
scheme is that the generated even subsequence is contractive
(Feje´r monotone) towards a v-GNE. Furthermore, the inertial
extrapolation step sizes, θk, can freely vary in [0, 1), namely,
they do not need to be monotonically non-decreasing. These
requirements are less restrictive than those in [36], [45], thus
resulting in more efficient algorithms.
Next, we first introduce the idea of alternated inertia in
operator-theoretic terms, and then apply it to two v-GNE
seeking algorithms, the I-pFB (Algorithm 1B) and the I-cPPP
(Algorithm 6). Let R be an averaged mapping. The alternating
inertial Banach–Picard iteration then reads as follows:
ω˜k :=
{
(1 + θ)ωk − θωk−1, if k odd,
ωk, if k even,
(41a)
ωk+1 = R(ω˜k). (41b)
where ω−1 = ω0 is the initialization.
Lemma 3: Let R be η−averaged, with fix(R) 6= ∅. Then,
the even subsequence (ω2k+2)k∈N generated by (41), with θ ∈(
0, 1−η
η
)
, converges to some ω¯ ∈ fix(R). 
Proof: The odd and even subsequences in (41b) read as
∀k ∈ N :


ω2k+1 = R(ω2k),
ω2k+2 = R((1 + θ)ω2k+1 − θω2k)
= R ◦ ((1 + θ)R− θId) (ω2k).
(42)
Let us define the mapping Rθ := R ◦ ((1 + θ)R − θ Id). The
next lemma shows that, for θ small enough, Rθ is averaged
and has the same fixed points of R.
Lemma 4: Let R be η−averaged, with η ∈ (0, 1), and set
θ ∈ (0, (1− η)/η). The following statements hold:
(i) (1 + θ)R− θ Id is µ−averaged, with µ = η(1 + θ),
(ii) fix((1 + θ)R − θ Id) = fix(R),
(iii) Rθ is ν−averaged, with ν =
η+µ−2ηµ
1−ηµ ∈ (0, 1),
(iv) fix(Rθ) = fix(R).
Proof: (i) It directly follows from [26, Prop. 4.40]. (ii)
ω ∈ fix((1+ θ)R− θ Id)⇔ (1+ θ)R(ω)− θ(ω) = ω ⇔ (1+
θ)R(ω) = (1+θ)ω ⇔ ω ∈ fix(R). (iii) It follows by [26, Prop.
4.44], since Rθ is the composition of R and (1 + θ)R− θ Id,
that are η− and µ− averaged, respectively. (iv) It follows by
[26, Cor. 4.51] that fix(Rθ) = fix(R ◦ (1 + θ)R − θ Id)) =
fix(R) ∩ fix((1 + θ)R − θ Id)) = fix(R).
In view of (42) and Lemma 4, the even subsequence in
(41b) can be recast as
ω2k+2 = Rθ(ω
2k), ∀k ∈ N, (43)
where Rθ is ν−averaged, with ν ∈ (0, 1) given by Lemma
4 (iii). Thus, the convergence of the sequence (ωk+2)k∈N to
some ω¯ ∈ fix(Rθ) = fix(R) follows by [26, Prop. 5.15].
Finally, we propose some explicit rules to choose the alter-
nating inertial extrapolation step sizes for the pFB (Algorithm
1B) and for the cPPP (Algorithm 6). In fact, in Section V-B,
we observe via numerical simulations that these alternated-
inertia variants outperform the standard-inertia algorithms in
terms of convergence speed. Let us then conclude the section
with the associated convergence results.
Corollary 1: (Convergence of alternating inertial pFB (aI-
pFB)) Let Assumptions 1, 3 hold true. Then, the sequence
(col(xk, λk))k∈N generated by Algorithm 1B with extrapola-
tion steps set as
θk =
{
θ ∈
[
0, 2δγ−12δγ
)
, if k, odd
0 if k even
(44)
globally converges to some col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), where x∗
is a v-GNE. 
Proof: The pFB algorithm (Algorithm 1) reads as the
fixed-point iteration in (20), where the mapping RFB is η :=
( 2δγ4δγ−1 )−averaged w.r.t. the Φ−induced norm. Therefore, the
iteration with alternated inertia and extrapolation step sizes
0 ≤ θ < 1−η
η
= 2δγ−12δγ converges by Lemma 3.
Corollary 2: (Convergence of alternating inertial cPPP (aI-
cPPP)) Consider the game in (4) with cost functions as in
(31). Let Assumptions 1 and 4 hold true. Then, the sequence
(col(xk, λk))k∈N generated by Algorithm 6 with extrapolation
steps set as
θk =
{
θ ∈ [0, 1), if k, odd
0, if k even
(45)
globally converges to some col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), where x∗
is a v-GNE. 
Proof: The non-inertial cPPP (Algorithm 6) reads as
the fixed-point iteration in (35) with θ = 0, where the
resolvent mapping JΦ−1
C
T is firmly-nonexpansive, i.e., η :=
1
2−averaged, w.r.t. the ΦC−induced norm. Therefore, the
iteration with alternated inertia and extrapolation step sizes
0 ≤ θ < 1−η
η
= 1 converges by Lemma 3.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE APPLICATION: CHARGING CONTROL OF
PLUG-IN ELECTRIC VEHICLES
To study the performance of the proposed algorithms, we
formulate a charging coordination problem for a large popu-
lation of nooncooperative plug-in electric vehicles (PEV) as
a generalized aggregative game, as in [17, §6]. In subsection
V-A, we introduce the model for the PEV agents, formalize the
charging control game and verify that the necessary technical
assumptions are satisfied. In subsection V-B we compare the
performance of our algorithm against some standard methods.
A. Game formulation
We adopt the same model in [17, §6]. Consider the charging
coordination problem for a large population of N ≫ 1
noncooperative PEV over a time horizon made of multiple
charging intervals {1, 2, . . . , n}. The state of vehicle i at time
t is denote by the variable si(t). The time evolution of si(t)
is described by the discrete-time system
si(t+ 1) = si(t) + bixi(t), t = 1, . . . , n,
where xi(t) denotes the charging control input and bi the
charging efficiency.
Constraints: At each time instant t, the charging input
xi(t) must be nonnegative and cannot exceed an upper bound
x¯i(t) ≥ 0. Moreover, the final state of charge must satisfy
si(n + 1) ≥ ηi, where ηi ≥ 0 is the desired state of charge
of vehicle i. We assume that each PEV agent i decides on
its charging strategy xi = col(xi(1), . . . , xi(n)) ∈ Ωi ⊂ Rn,
where the set Ωi can be expressed as
Ωi := {xi ∈ R
n | 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ x¯i(t), ∀t = 1, . . . , n;
and
∑n
t=1 xi(t) ≥ li} , (46)
where li = b
−1
i (ηi − si(1)) and si(1) is the state of charge at
the beginning of the time horizon.
Furthermore, for each time instant t, the overall power that
the grid can deliver to the PEV is denoted by NK(t), thus
introducing the following coupling constraints:
1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) ≤ K(t), for all t = . . . , n, (47)
which in compact form can be cast as (1⊤N ⊗ In)x ≤ NK ,
with K = [K(1), . . .K(n)]⊤.
Cost functions: The cost function of each PEV represents
its electricity bill over the horizon of length n plus a local
penalty term gi (e.g., the battery degradation cost [46], [47]),
i.e,
Ji(xi,x−i) =
n∑
t=1
gi,t(xi(t)) + pt
(
d(t) + avg(x(t))
κ(t)
)
xi(t)
=: gi(xi) + p(avg(x))
⊤xi, (48)
where gi is convex and the energy price for each time interval
pt : R≥0 → R>0 is monotonically increasing, continuosly
differentiable and depends on the ratio between the total con-
sumption and the total capacity, i.e., (d(t) + avg(x(t)))/κ(t),
where d(t) and avg(x(t)) := 1
N
∑N
i=1 xi(t) represent the non-
PEV and PEV demand at time t divided by N and κ(t) is the
total production capacity divided by N as in [7, eq. (6)].
Aggregative game: Overall, each PEV i, given the charg-
ing inputs of the other PEV, aims at solving the following
optimization problem:
(∀i ∈ I) :


argmin
xi∈Rn
gi(xi) + p(avg(x))
⊤xi
s.t. xi ∈ Ωi,
(1⊤N ⊗ In)x ≤ NK,
(49)
Next, we show that the proposed charging control game in
(49) does satisfy our technical setup. The local cost functions
Ji’s in (48) are convex w.r.t. the local variable xi, the local
constraint sets Ωi’s in (46) are non-empty (for an appropriate
choice of the parameters), convex and compact, the coupling
constraints in (47) are affine and their intersection with the
local constraints non-empty (for an appropriate choice of the
parameters), namely, the Slater’s condition holds true. Hence,
Assumption 1 is satisfied. In particular, there exist at least one
GNE of the game in (49), see Remark 2.
The correspondent PG in (8) and approximate PG in (11)
read more explicitly as follows:
F˜ (x) = col ({p(avg(x))}i∈I) , (50)
F (x) = F˜ + 1
N
col
(
∇zp(z)|z=avg(x)xi}i∈I
)
. (51)
The following lemma shows the properties of these mappings
depending on the choice of the price function p in (48).
Lemma 5 ([17, Lemma 3]): The following hold:
(i) For all i ∈ I, let gi be convex and the price function p
be monotone, then F˜ in (50) is maximally monotone;
(ii) For all i ∈ I, let gi be convex and the price function
p be affine, i.e., p(avg(x)) = Cavg(x) + c, with C ∈
R
m×nN , and strongly monotone, i.e., (C +C⊤)/2 ≻ 0,
then F in (51) is strongly monotone. 
Proof: (i) and (ii) follow from [17, Lemma 3 (i)].
B. Numerical analysis
In our numerical study we consider an heterogeneous popu-
lation of PEV playing over a time horizon of n = 24 charging
intervals. All the parameters of the game are drawn from
Fig. 1: Number of iterations to achieve convergence for FoRB
(Alg. 5, θ = 0) and FBF (Alg. 4) vs populations size N . The
areas contain the outcome of 10 random simulations for each
N ∈ {50, 60, . . . , 200}. Convergence is considered achieved
when ‖xk − x⋆‖/‖x⋆‖ ≤ 10−4, where x⋆ is a v-GAE.
uniform distributions and fixed over the course of a simulation.
Specifically, for all i ∈ I, we set: the desired final state of
charge li in (46) according to li ∼ (0.5, 1.5), where ∼ (τ1, τ2)
denotes the uniform distribution over an interval (τ1, τ2) with
τ1 < τ2; for all t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the upper charging input bound
as x¯i(t) ∼ (1, 5), with probability 0.8, x¯i(t) = 0 otherwise.
For all t, the non-PEV demand d(t) is taken as the typical base
demand over a summer day in the United States [7, Figure 1];
κ(t) = 12 kW, and the upper bound K(t) = 0.55 kW is
chosen such that the coupling constraints in (47) are active in
the middle of the night.
In the remainder of this section, we study the convergence
properties of the proposed algorithms on two different scenar-
ios characterized by a different choice of the price function p
and local cost functions gi, in (48).
1) Monotone price function: Consider the price function
pt (avg(x(t))) := 0.15
(
d(t)+avg(x(t)))
κ(t)
)1.5
, ∀t. (52)
as in [7, §VII.B] and a local cost function gi defined as
gi(xi) = πi (
∑n
t=1 xi(t))
2
+ a⊤i xi, ∀iI, (53)
where πi ∼ (0.1, 0.8) and ai(t) ∼ (0.1, 0.4), for all t ∈
{1, . . . , n}. Under these choices, it follows from Lemma 5
(i) that the approximate PG in (50) is maximally monotone.
Therefore, a v-GAE of the game in (49) can be found with
the algorithms in Section III-C and the FoRB (Algorithm 5).
In Fig. 1, we compare the total number of iterations required
by FBF (Alg. 4) and FoRB (Alg. 5) to achieve convergence
to a v-GAE (i.e., ‖xk − x⋆‖/‖x⋆‖ ≤ 10−4), over different
population sizesN varying from 50 to 200 agents. For eachN ,
we run 10 simulations with random parameters. On average,
FoRB converges at least 5 times faster than FBF in terms
of number of iterations, and, thus, 10 times faster in terms of
communication rounds between PEVs and central coordinator.
Moreover, unlike FBF, the convergence speed of FoRB seems
not affected by increasing the number of agents and randomly
varying the parameters of the problem.
2) Linear price function: Consider the price function
p(avg(x)) := C avg(x) + c, (54)
where C = In, c = col(d(1), . . . , d(n)), and the local convex
cost function gi, for all i ∈ I, as
gi(xi) =
1
2x
⊤
i Qixi + p
⊤
i xi. (55)
For instance, the local penalty term gi in (55) can model a
convex quadratic battery degradation cost as in [46, Eq. (5)],
[47, Eq. (8)], possibly plus a quadratic penalty ‖xi − xrefi ‖
2
on the deviation from a preferred charging strategy xrefi ∈ Ωi.
Under these choices, the pseudo-gradient mapping F in
(51) is strongly monotone, by Lemma 5 (ii), and Lipschitz
continuous, since affine. Thus, it follows by Remark 5 that F
is cocoercive. The unique v-GNE of the game in (49) can be
found with the algorithms in Section III-B and, since the cost
functions have the same structure in (31), with the cPPP.
First, we consider an heterogeneous population of PEV’s,
by setting the parameters of the local penalty terms gi
in (55) as follows: Qi = diag(q(1), . . . , q(n)), pi =
col(pi(1), . . . , pi(n)), with qi(t) ∼ (0.1, 4) and pi(t) ∼
(0.2, 2), for all t. In Fig. 2a, we compare the average
number of iterations required to achieve convergence (i.e.,
‖xk − x∗‖/‖x∗‖ ≤ 10−6) for pFB (Alg. 1), cPPP (Alg. 6)
and their inertial variants, for different population sizes N . For
each N , we run 10 simulations with random parameters and
considered the average number of iterations for convergence.
The step sizes of all the algorithms are set 1% smaller than
their theoretical upper bounds. On average, cPPP outperforms
pFB. For both pFB and cPPP, their inertial variants show better
performances with respect to the vanilla algorithms. Overall,
the over-relaxed cPPP is the fastest among all the considered
methodologies. We note that, the convergence speed of all the
algorithms seems only mildly affected by the population size.
In Fig. 2b, we repeat the same analysis for an homogeneous
population of PEV’s. Specifically, we set the parameters of the
local penalty term in (55) as Qi = 0.1 and pi = 0.2, for all
i ∈ N . The performances of all the algorithms improve with
respect to the case with heterogeneous agents. On average,
cPPP requires less then half the iterations/communication
rounds of pFB. For both pFB and CPPP, their inertial vari-
ants show better performances with respect to the standard
algorithms. Overall, the alternated inertial cPPP (aI-cPPP) and
the over-relaxed cPPP (or-cPPP) are the fastest among all the
considered methodologies (less than 50 communication rounds
with the central coordinator to achieve a precision of 10−6,
independently on the total number of PEVs).
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Generalized Nash equilibrium problems in monotone ag-
gregative games can be efficiently solved via accelerated,
semi-decentralized, single-layer, single-communication-per-
iteration, fixed-step algorithms. For this class of equilibrium
problems, the over-relaxation seems the most effective decen-
tralized way to speed up convergence. The study of adaptive
step sizes is left for future work.
(a) Heterogeneous population of PEVs. The step sizes of pFB and
cPPP have been set 1% smaller than their theoretical upper bounds.
(b) Homogeneous population of PEVs. The step sizes of pFB and
cPPP have been set 1% smaller than their theoretical upper bounds.
Fig. 2: Iterations to achieve convergence for different population
sizes. Each polygon is the average over 120 random simulations.
Convergence is considered achieved when ‖xk−x∗‖/‖x∗‖ ≤ 10−6.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
To establish global convergence, we show that
(i) Algorithm 5 corresponds to a preconditioned inertial
FoRB splitting method [38, Eqn. (45)] in (30);
(ii) If the step-sizes {αi}i∈I , β and the extrapolation
parameter θ are chosen as in Algorithm 5, then
the assumptions of [38, Corollary 4.4] are satisfied,
hence (col(xk, λk))k∈N globally convergences to some
col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE.
(i): Let us recast Algorithm 4 in a compact form as
xk+1 = diag(proxα1g1+ιΩ1 , . . . , proxαNgN+ιΩN
)
◦
(
x˜k − α¯(2F (xk)− F (xk−1) +A⊤λk)
)
, (56)
λk+1 = projRm
≥0
(
λ˜k + β(2Axk+1 −Axk − b)
)
. (57)
Since diag(proxα1g1+ιΩ1 , . . . , proxαNgN+ιΩN
) = (Id+NΩ+
α¯G)−1, it follows by (56) that (Id + NΩ + α¯G)(x
k+1) ∈
x˜k − α¯(2F (xk)− F (xk−1) +A⊤λk), which leads to
− (2F (xk)− F (xk−1)) ∈ (NΩ +G)(x
k+1) +A⊤λk+1
+ α¯−1(xk+1 − x˜k)−A⊤(λk+1 − λk) (58)
where we used α¯−1NΩ(x
k+1) = NΩ(x
k+1). Equivalently,
it follows from (57) that (Id + NRm
≥0
)(λk+1) ∈ λ˜k +
β 1
N
(2Axk+1 −Axk − b), which leads to
− b ∈ NRmN
≥0
(λk+1)−Axk+1
−A(xk+1 − xk) +Nβ−1(λk+1 − λ˜k). (59)
Let ωk := col(xk, λk) be the stacked vector of the iterates.
The inclusions in (58)-(59) can be cast in compact form as
−(2T1(ωk)− T1(ωk−1)) ∈ T2(ωk+1) + Φ(ωk+1 − ω˜
k),
where T1, T2 and Φ as in (17), (18) and (19), respectively. By
making ωk+1 explicit in the last inclusion, we obtain
ωk+1 = (Id + Φ−1T2)
−1
◦ (ω˜k − 2Φ−1T1(ω
k) + Φ−1T1(ω
k−1)), (60)
where the auxiliary updates can be cast in a compact form as
ω˜k = ωk + θ(ωk − ωk−1), (61)
thus concluding the first part of the proof.
(ii): Before studying the convergence of iteration (60), we
show that, if the step-sizes are chosen as in Algorithm 5, then
the preconditioning matrix Φ is positive definite.
Lemma 6: Let {αi}i∈I and β be set as in Algorithm 5.
Then, the following statements hold:
(i) Φ− δI  0;
(ii) ‖Φ−1‖ ≤ δ−1. 
Proof: (i): By the generalized Gershgorin circular theo-
rem [48, Th. 2], each eigenvalue µ of the matrix Φ in (19)
satisfies at least one of the following inequalities:
µ ≥ α−1i − ‖A
⊤
i ‖, ∀i ∈ I, (62)
µ ≥ Nβ−1 −
∑N
j=1 ‖A
⊤
j ‖. (63)
Hence, if we set the step-sizes {αi}i∈I , β as in Algorithm 5,
the inequalities (62)-(63) yield to µ ≥ δ, where δ > 2ℓ by
design choice. It follows that the smallest eigenvalue of Φ,
i.e., µmin(Φ), satisfies µmin(Φ) ≥ δ > 0. Hence, Φ− δI  0.
(ii): Let µmax(Φ) be the largest eigenvalue of Φ. We have
that µmax(Φ) ≥ µmin(Φ) > δ. Moreover, ‖Φ‖ = µmax(Φ) ≥
µmin(Φ) =
1
‖Φ−1‖ ≥ δ. Hence ‖Φ
−1‖ ≤ δ−1.
Since Φ−1 is δ−1−Lipschitz, by Lemma 6 (ii), and T1 is
ℓ−Lipschitz, by Assumption 2, then their composition, i.e.,
Φ−1 ◦ T1, is τ−Lipschitz continuous, with τ := δ−1ℓ < (1−
3θ)/2, since δ > 2ℓ/(1− 3θ), by design choice.
The fixed-point iteration (60), that corresponds to Algorithm
5 by the first part of this proof, is the inertial FoRB splitting
algorithm on the mappings Φ−1T1 and Φ
−1T2. The conver-
gence of (60) to some ω∗ := col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(T1 + T2)
follows by [38, Corollary 4.4, Remark 2.6], since Φ−1T1 and
Φ−1T2 are maximally monotone in the Φ−induced norm and
Φ−1T1 is τ−Lipschitz continuous, with τ < (1 − 3θ)/2. To
conclude, we note that ω∗ ∈ zer(Φ−1T1+Φ−1T2) = zer(T ),
since Φ ≻ 0, by Lemma 6 (i), and T1 + T2 = T . Since the
limit point ω∗ ∈ zer(T ) 6= ∅, then x∗ is a v-GNE of the
game in (4), by Proposition 1, thus concluding the proof. 
B. Proof of Theorem 2
To establish global convergence, we show that
(i) Algorithm 6 corresponds to the inertial PPP method [45,
Th. 2.1] in (35);
(ii) If the step-sizes {αi}i∈I , β and the inertial param-
eter θ are chosen as in Algorithm 6, then the as-
sumptions of [45, Th. 2.1, Prop. 2.1] are satisfied,
hence (col(xk, λk))k∈N globally convergences to some
col(x∗, λ∗) ∈ zer(T ), where x∗ is a v-GNE.
(i): With some cosmetic manipulations, we can rewrite the
local primal update of agent i as the solution to
xk+1i = argmin
z∈Ωi
Ji
(
z, x˜k−i
)
+ (A⊤i λ˜
k
i )
⊤
z + 12αi
∥∥z − x˜ki ∥∥2 ,
with Ji as in (31). Equivalently, x
k+1
i must satisfy
0n ∈ ∂xi
(
Ji
(
xk+1i , x˜
k
−i
)
+ (A⊤i λ˜
k
i )
⊤
xk+1i
+ 12αi
∥∥xk+1i − x˜ki ∥∥2 ).
Since ∂xiJi(x
k+1
i , x˜
k
−i) = ∂xigi(x
k+1
i ) +
1
N
∑N
j 6=i Cx˜
k
j +
2
N
Cxk+1i , then the previous inclusion can be rewritten as
0n ∈ ∂xigi(x
k+1
i )+
2
N
Cxk+1i +
1
N
[(1⊤N⊗C)x
k+1−Cxk+1i ]
+A⊤i λ
k+1
i +
1
αi
(xk+1i − x˜
k
i )−
1
N
[(1⊤N ⊗ C)(x
k+1 − x˜k)
+ C(xk+1i − x˜
k
i )]−A
⊤
i (λ
k+1 − λk). (64)
By stacking-up the inclusions (64), for all i ∈ I, we obtain
0nN ∈ G(xk+1) +
2
N
(IN ⊗ C)xk+1−
1
N
((IN − 11
⊤)⊗ C)xk+1 +A⊤λk+1 + α¯−1(xk+1 − x˜k)
+ 1
N
((IN − 11
⊤)⊗ C)(xk+1 − x˜k)−A⊤(λk+1 − λ˜k),
(65)
where the first 3 terms on the right-hand side correspond to
the pseudo-subdifferential mapping P (xk+1), i.e., G(xk+1)+
2
N
(IN ⊗C)(xk+1)−
1
N
((IN −11
⊤)⊗C)(xk+1) = P (xk+1).
It follows by the dual update in Algorithm 6 that (Id +
NRm
≥0
)(λk+1) ∈ λk + β 1
N
(2Axk+1 − Ax˜k − b), which leads
to
0m ∈ NRmN
≥0
(λk+1)− (Axk+1 − b)
−A(xk+1 − x˜k) +Nβ−1(λk+1 − λ˜k). (66)
Let ωk := col(xk, λk) be the stacked vector of the iterates.
The inclusions in (65)-(66) can be cast in a compact form as
0 ∈ T (ωk+1) + ΦC(ωk+1 − ω˜
k),
where T and ΦC as in (15) and (36), respectively. By making
ωk+1 explicit in the last inclusion, we obtain
ωk+1 = (Id + Φ−1C T )
−1(ω˜k), (67)
where the auxiliary updates can be cast in a compact form as
ω˜k = ωk + θ(ωk − ωk−1). (68)
By combining (67) and (68), we obtain the fixed-point
iteration in (35), that correspond to the inertial PPP method
[45, Th. 2.1] on Φ−1C T and, thus, concludes the first part of
the proof.
(ii): The following Lemma shows that, if the step-sizes are
chosen as in Algorithm 6, then the preconditioning matrix ΦC
is positive definite.
Lemma 7: Let {αi}i∈I and β be set as in Algorithm 6,
then, ΦC ≻ 0. 
Proof: This proof follows the same technical reasoning
of the proof of Lemma 6 (i) and, thus, is omitted due to space
limitation.
The fixed-point iteration (35), that corresponds to Algo-
rithm 6 by the first part of this proof, is the inertial PPP
algorithm applied on the operator Φ−1C T . The convergence of
(35) to some ω∗ := col(x∗,λ∗) ∈ zer(T ) follows by [45,
Th. 2.1, Prop. 2.1], since Φ−1C T is maximally monotone in
the ΦC−induced norm and θ ∈ [0, 1/3). To conclude, we note
that ω∗ ∈ zer(Φ−1C T ) = zer(T ), since ΦC ≻ 0, by Lemma 7.
Since the limit point ω∗ ∈ zer(T ) 6= ∅, then x∗ is a v-GNE
of the game in (4), by Proposition 1, concluding the proof. 
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